RESEARCH PAPER: Secondary Victimisation in the Criminal Justice System: Institutional Harm, Legal Safeguards and the Road to Trauma-Informed Justice, AUTHOR: Jeysoorya G
Secondary victimisation refers to the additional harm that a victim of crime suffers not from the offender but from the response of institutions, professionals and society to the original offence. This paper examines how police stations, medical examination rooms and criminal courts can reproduce the trauma of crime through disbelief, delay, intrusive questioning and loss of control over the process. Adopting a doctrinal and analytical methodology supported by published empirical literature, the paper studies the concept’s origins in victimology, its manifestations at each stage of the criminal process, and the legal response in India, with comparative reference to international and European standards
RESEARCH PAPER
Abstract
Secondary victimisation refers to the additional harm that a victim of crime suffers not from the offender but from the response of institutions, professionals and society to the original offence. This paper examines how police stations, medical examination rooms and criminal courts can reproduce the trauma of crime through disbelief, delay, intrusive questioning and loss of control over the process. Adopting a doctrinal and analytical methodology supported by published empirical literature, the paper studies the concept’s origins in victimology, its manifestations at each stage of the criminal process, and the legal response in India, with comparative reference to international and European standards. It analyses the constitutional guarantee under Article 21, the safeguards in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and the law of evidence, and key judgments such as Sakshi v. Union of India. The paper finds that Indian law has progressively recognised victim dignity, but that fragmentation, rape myths, procedural delay and the absence of enforceable victim rights allow secondary victimisation to persist. It recommends a statutory victims’ charter, mandatory trauma-informed training, support persons, regulated cross-examination and time-bound trials. It concludes that the legitimacy of criminal justice depends on treating victims as participants with dignity rather than as mere sources of evidence.
Keywords: Secondary victimisation; victims’ rights; criminal justice system; sexual offences; trauma-informed justice; cross-examination
1. Introduction
The criminal justice system exists to vindicate the victim of wrongdoing, yet for many victims the encounter with that system becomes a fresh source of injury. A woman who reports rape may be asked why she was out at night, a child may be required to recount abuse within sight of the accused, and the victim of an assault may wait a decade for a verdict while the case is adjourned again and again. These experiences illustrate what victimologists call secondary victimisation, a term associated with Martin Symonds, who described the “second injury” suffered by victims who meet disbelief, indifference or suspicion from the very institutions to which they turn for help.[1] Primary victimisation is inflicted by the offender; secondary victimisation is inflicted by the response of the system and is, therefore, in principle avoidable.
The concern is not new in India. In Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court acquitted two policemen accused of raping a young tribal girl in a police station, reasoning that her failure to raise an alarm indicated consent.[2] The decision provoked public outrage and contributed to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983, which introduced a presumption as to absence of consent in specified rape prosecutions, mandated in-camera trials and prohibited disclosure of the victim’s identity.[3] Further reforms followed the 2012 Delhi gang rape, and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) has since re-enacted and expanded several victim-oriented safeguards.[4]
Despite this history, there remains a gap between legislative promise and institutional practice. Pratiksha Baxi’s ethnographic study of rape trials documents how courtroom routines can expose complainants to humiliation even where the law formally protects them.[5] Official data compound the concern: the National Crime Records Bureau reported a conviction rate of 27.4 per cent for rape in 2022.[6] That figure has many causes, but it is consistent with victims withdrawing from, or being failed by, a process they experience as hostile.
This paper examines secondary victimisation across the criminal process, with principal reference to India and comparative reference to international and European standards. Although the discussion draws heavily on sexual offences, where research and litigation are concentrated, the phenomenon is not confined to them; victims of domestic violence, trafficking, child abuse and caste atrocities encounter similar institutional harm. The topic is significant for three reasons. It engages the constitutional guarantee of dignity under Article 21;[7] it affects the reporting of crime and the willingness of witnesses to testify, and therefore the efficiency of prosecution; and, as the procedural justice literature suggests, the way institutions treat people shapes the legitimacy of the law itself.[8]
2. Research Problem and Research Questions
Indian law now contains a range of protective provisions, from the requirement that complaints of sexual offences be recorded by a woman officer to the bar on questions about a complainant’s sexual history. Yet these provisions are scattered across several statutes, are frequently framed as duties of the State rather than rights of the victim, and depend for enforcement on the discretion of the same officials whose conduct causes harm. The research problem is therefore the gap between the normative recognition of victim dignity and its realisation in police stations, hospitals and courtrooms, together with the absence of an effective remedy when that dignity is violated. The paper addresses four research questions:
1. What is secondary victimisation, and how does it differ from primary and repeat victimisation?
2. At which stages of the criminal process, and in what forms, does secondary victimisation occur?
3. How adequate is the Indian legal framework when measured against constitutional principles and international standards?
4. What reforms can reduce secondary victimisation without compromising the accused’s right to a fair trial?
3. Research Objectives
The principal objectives of the study are:
1. to clarify the concept and theoretical foundations of secondary victimisation;
2. to map its manifestations at the police, medical, trial and post-trial stages;
3. to evaluate critically the statutory and judicial safeguards available in India, with reference to international standards; and
4. to recommend workable reforms that respect both victims’ dignity and defendants’ rights.
4. Research Methodology
The study adopts a doctrinal and analytical methodology, supplemented by limited comparative analysis. The doctrinal component examines primary sources: constitutional provisions, statutes including the BNSS, the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA), together with judgments of the Supreme Court of India.[9] Secondary sources comprise books, peer-reviewed journal articles, and reports of the Law Commission of India and expert committees. The comparative component draws on the 1985 United Nations Declaration on victims’ rights, the European Union’s Victims’ Directive and the law of England and Wales.
The paper does not collect original field data. It relies instead on published empirical studies, many of which originate in Western jurisdictions, and on Indian qualitative scholarship. Findings on the prevalence of secondary victimisation in India should therefore be read as indicative rather than conclusive. Citations follow the Bluebook (21st ed.) format.
5. Literature Review
The literature on secondary victimisation begins with Symonds and with early empirical work by Shapland, Willmore and Duff, who found that victims’ initial enthusiasm for prosecution often gave way to dissatisfaction as they were marginalised by procedures designed around the State and the accused.[10] In the context of sexual violence, Campbell and Raja defined the phenomenon through victim-blaming and insensitive responses by professionals, and later work by Campbell and colleagues described survivors’ experiences with legal and medical systems as a “second rape”.[11] Orth found that victims’ perceptions of unfair treatment and unsatisfactory outcomes were associated with greater psychological distress,[12] while Herman argued that the adversarial process, with its emphasis on attacking credibility, is poorly suited to the needs of traumatised witnesses.[13]
A second strand explains why such treatment occurs. Burt’s work on rape-myth acceptance, and later studies by Temkin and Krahé, show how stereotypes about “real rape” and “genuine victims” influence decision-makers.[14] Estrich’s account of the law’s traditional distrust of rape complainants remains influential,[15] and Christie’s notion of the “ideal victim” explains why those who deviate from the image of the blameless, vulnerable victim receive less sympathy.[16]
A third strand debates the victim’s role in criminal procedure. Ashworth cautions that victim participation must not undermine the defendant’s rights, while Walklate and van Dijk warn against uncritical constructions of victimhood.[17] Indian scholarship has concentrated on rape law and its evidentiary rules. Baxi examines trial practice, Satish studies discretion and discrimination in rape adjudication, and the Law Commission, the Malimath Committee and the Justice Verma Committee have each recommended victim-sensitive reform.[18]
Three gaps emerge. First, few Indian studies trace secondary victimisation across the whole process rather than at the trial stage alone. Second, scholarship has yet to assess the victim-oriented provisions of the BNSS, which came into force in 2024. Third, empirical research on victims of non-sexual offences is scarce. This paper addresses the first two gaps through an integrated, stage-by-stage analysis and signals the third as an area for further research.
6. Main Analysis and Discussion
6.1 Conceptual Framework
6.1.1 Primary, Secondary and Repeat Victimisation
Primary victimisation is the direct harm caused by the offence. Repeat victimisation refers to a further offence against the same victim. Secondary victimisation, by contrast, is the additional psychological, social or material harm caused not by the offender but by the response of individuals and institutions, through behaviour such as disbelief, blame, insensitivity, intrusive procedures and unnecessary delay.[19] The European Union’s Victims’ Directive recognises the distinction by requiring protection from “secondary and repeat victimisation”.[20] The harm may be emotional, such as shame, anxiety and renewed trauma; practical, such as lost wages and repeated court visits; or social, such as stigma within the family and community. It is the avoidable character of this harm that makes it a proper subject of legal regulation.
6.1.2 Theoretical Explanations
Three explanations are commonly offered. The first is procedural justice: people judge institutions less by outcomes than by whether they are treated with respect, given a voice and dealt with neutrally.[21] Where victims are ignored, interrupted or disbelieved, the process itself feels unjust, whatever the verdict. The second is trauma theory: Herman observes that recovery depends on restoring safety and a sense of control, yet adversarial procedure removes control by subjecting the victim to examination on terms she does not set.[22] The third is the persistence of cultural myths. Burt’s research shows that false beliefs, for example that “real” victims always resist physically or that women who dress or behave in certain ways invite assault, influence how police, doctors and judges assess credibility.[23] In India these myths intersect with caste, class and notions of family honour, so that Dalit, tribal and poor complainants may face compounded scepticism.[24]
6.2 Manifestations Across the Criminal Process
Secondary victimisation is best understood as a cumulative process in which each stage adds to the burden carried from the last. Table 1 summarises the principal forms and Indian safeguards at each stage; the discussion that follows examines them in turn.
[1] Martin Symonds, The “Second Injury” to Victims, 2 Evaluation & Change 36 (1980) (special issue).
[2] Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 S.C.C. 143 (India).
[3] Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983, No. 43 of 1983 (India) (inserting, inter alia, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 114A; Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 228A; and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 327(2)–(3)).
[4] Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, No. 46 of 2023 (India) [hereinafter BNSS].
[5] Pratiksha Baxi, Public Secrets of Law: Rape Trials in India (2014).
[6] Nat’l Crime Recs. Bureau, Ministry of Home Affs., Crime in India 2022 (2023).
[7] India Const. art. 21.
[8] Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).
[9] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, No. 45 of 2023 (India) [hereinafter BNS]; Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, No. 32 of 2012 (India) [hereinafter POCSO Act]; Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No. 1 of 1872 (India) [hereinafter IEA] (replaced by the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, No. 47 of 2023 (India), with effect from July 1, 2024).
[10] Joanna Shapland, Jon Willmore & Peter Duff, Victims in the Criminal Justice System (1985).
[11] Rebecca Campbell & Sheela Raja, Secondary Victimization of Rape Victims: Insights from Mental Health Professionals Who Treat Survivors of Violence, 14 Violence & Victims 261 (1999); Rebecca Campbell et al., Preventing the “Second Rape”: Rape Survivors’ Experiences with Community Service Providers, 16 J. Interpersonal Violence 1239 (2001).
[12] Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings, 15 Soc. Just. Rsch. 313 (2002).
[13] Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention, 16 J. Traumatic Stress 159 (2003).
[14] Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 217 (1980); Jennifer Temkin & Barbara Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (2008).
[15] Susan Estrich, Real Rape (1987).
[16] Nils Christie, The Ideal Victim, in From Crime Policy to Victim Policy 17 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1986).
[17] Andrew Ashworth, Victims’ Rights, Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure, in Integrating a Victim Perspective Within Criminal Justice (Adam Crawford & Jo Goodey eds., 2000); Sandra Walklate, Imagining the Victim of Crime (2007); Jan van Dijk, Free the Victim: A Critique of the Western Conception of Victimhood, 16 Int’l Rev. Victimology 1 (2009).
[18] Mrinal Satish, Discretion, Discrimination and the Rule of Law: Reforming Rape Sentencing in India (2016); Law Comm’n of India, Report No. 172, Review of Rape Laws (2000); Comm. on Reforms of Crim. Just. Sys., Ministry of Home Affs., Report (2003); Justice J.S. Verma Comm., Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (Jan. 23, 2013).
[19] Campbell & Raja, supra note 11.
[20] Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 Establishing Minimum Standards on the Rights, Support and Protection of Victims of Crime, art. 18, 2012 O.J. (L 315) 57.
[21] Tyler, supra note 8.
[22] Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (1992).
[23] Burt, supra note 14.
[24] See Satish, supra note 18; Baxi, supra note 5.
Stage
Typical forms of secondary victimisation
Principal safeguards (India)
Police
Refusal to register the FIR; disbelief and blame; pressure to compromise; repeated narration of events
Lalita Kumari; BNSS § 173(1) proviso (woman officer; recording at place of choice for disabled victims); BNSS § 183 (Magistrate’s statement)
Medical and forensic
Invasive or non-consensual examination; the “two-finger test”; delayed treatment
BNSS §§ 184, 397; Lillu; Shailendra Kumar Rai; 2014 health ministry guidelines
Trial
Hostile cross-examination; questions on sexual history; confrontation with the accused; open-court exposure
IEA §§ 53A, 146 proviso; BNSS § 366(2); Sakshi; POCSO Act §§ 24, 33, 36; BNSS § 398
Post-trial and systemic
Delay; lack of information; identity disclosure; inadequate compensation
BNSS § 396; BNS § 72; Nipun Saxena; Mallikarjun Kodagali
Source: Author’s compilation from the authorities discussed in Parts 6.2 and 6.3.
6.2.1 The Police Stage
For most victims the police station is the first point of contact, and it is where many are first failed. Common complaints include refusal to register the first information report (FIR), minimising the offence, questioning the victim’s character, and pressure to “compromise” with the accused, sometimes by marriage. In Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that registration of an FIR is mandatory where the information discloses a cognisable offence, a ruling prompted by the persistent problem of refusal.[1] Repeated narration of the incident to successive officers compounds the trauma. Statutory responses include the proviso to section 173(1) BNSS, which requires information about specified sexual offences to be recorded by a woman officer and, for victims with a mental or physical disability, to be recorded at their residence or a place of their choice in the presence of an interpreter or special educator, with videography.[2] Section 183 BNSS further provides for the statement of a victim of specified sexual offences to be recorded by a Magistrate, which can reduce repeated questioning.[3] The effectiveness of such provisions ultimately depends on police accountability, the subject of the structural directions in Prakash Singh v. Union of India.[4]
6.2.2 The Medical and Forensic Stage
Medical examination is necessary for evidence but can itself be invasive. The “two-finger test”, an examination of the vaginal laxity of rape survivors that has no scientific basis, was condemned by the Supreme Court in Lillu v. State of Haryana as violating the survivor’s right to privacy and dignity.[5] In 2022 the Court went further and directed that any person who conducts the test would be guilty of misconduct.[6] The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare’s 2014 guidelines prescribe a consent-based, trauma-sensitive protocol for medico-legal care.[7] Statutorily, section 184 BNSS governs examination of a rape victim by a registered medical practitioner with the victim’s consent, and section 397 BNSS requires hospitals to provide first-aid or medical treatment free of cost to victims of specified offences.[8] The fact that the Court had to reiterate its prohibition in 2022, almost a decade after Lillu, shows how slowly norms travel from the law reports to clinical practice.
6.2.3 The Trial Stage
The trial is the most intensively studied site of secondary victimisation. Cross-examination is the principal mechanism: questions about the victim’s past relationships, clothing, “character” or delay in complaining can convey that she, and not the accused, is on trial. Konradi’s study of rape survivors who testified shows how the experience of testimony shapes their view of justice.[9] The law offers several protections. Section 53A of the IEA makes evidence of a victim’s character or previous sexual experience irrelevant on the question of consent in sexual-offence prosecutions, and the proviso to section 146 bars corresponding questions in cross-examination.[10] Section 366(2) BNSS requires rape trials to be conducted in camera,[11] and section 72 BNS punishes the disclosure of a victim’s identity.[12]
The Supreme Court has repeatedly supplemented the statute. In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, it observed that insisting on corroboration of a victim’s testimony as a rule amounts to “adding insult to injury”,[13] and in State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar it held that even a woman who is not chaste is entitled to protection and that her testimony cannot be discarded merely on that ground.[14] In Sakshi v. Union of India, the Court issued directions to protect child victims of sexual abuse from direct confrontation with the accused, including the use of screens and the putting of defence questions through the presiding officer in writing.[15] The POCSO Act institutionalises similar measures for child victims, including recording of statements in a child-friendly setting and protection from contact with the accused.[16]
Witness protection also matters, since intimidation and hostility undermine trials and leave victims exposed. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court stressed that a fair trial includes the protection of witnesses,[17] and in Mahender Chawla v. Union of India it approved the Witness Protection Scheme, 2018 as law to operate until legislation is enacted.[18] Section 398 BNSS now requires every State government to prepare and notify a witness protection scheme.[19]
6.2.4 Delay, Publicity and Loss of Voice
Beyond the examination room, secondary victimisation arises from the structure of the process. Delay is the most obvious: prolonged trials prolong the victim’s association with the offence and increase the risk of intimidation, fading memory and attrition. The 1985 United Nations Declaration expressly calls for avoiding unnecessary delay in the disposal of cases and in the execution of orders granting awards to victims.[20]
Victims also lack information and standing. Procedure traditionally treated the victim as a witness for the prosecution rather than a participant, and the right to appeal against an acquittal, introduced through the proviso to section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was affirmed in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka.[21] Section 2(1)(y) BNSS defines “victim” to include the guardian or legal heir, laying the basis for such participation. Publicity is a further source of harm: disclosure of a victim’s name exposes her to stigma. In Nipun Saxena v. Union of India the Court held that the identity of victims of sexual offences must not be disclosed in any manner, and directed the framing of a model compensation scheme for victims of sexual violence.[22] Section 396 BNSS now requires every State to prepare a victim compensation scheme,[23] though its value depends on timely and accessible disbursement.
6.3 Legal Framework and Judicial Response
6.3.1 Constitutional Foundations
Indian courts have located protection against secondary victimisation in Article 21. In Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, the Court held that rape violates the victim’s fundamental right to life with dignity and recognised the power to award interim compensation.[24] In Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India it recommended legal representation for rape complainants at the police-station stage, counselling, anonymity, and compensation through a Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.[25] Article 14 supports these principles by prohibiting arbitrary, stereotype-based treatment. At the same time, the accused’s right to a fair trial under Articles 14 and 21 imposes limits: protecting victims cannot mean denying the defence the opportunity to test the prosecution’s evidence. The task is one of calibration, not displacement.
6.3.2 International and Comparative Standards
The 1985 United Nations Declaration requires that victims be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity and that processes be responsive to their needs, including by providing information, allowing their views to be presented and minimising inconvenience while protecting privacy.[26] The European Union’s Directive goes further by converting principles into duties: it guarantees the right to understand and be understood, the right to information, and an individual assessment of protection needs, and it allows measures that avoid unnecessary questioning about the victim’s private life.[27]
England and Wales illustrates procedural regulation of cross-examination. The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 restricts evidence and questioning about a complainant’s sexual behaviour in sexual-offence trials without leave of the court, prohibits the accused from personally cross-examining the complainant, and permits special measures such as screens and live links for vulnerable witnesses.[28] These measures show that regulating the manner of examination is compatible with a fair trial.
6.3.3 Assessment of the Indian Framework
Three weaknesses emerge. First, the framework is fragmented. Protections sit in the BNSS, the BNS, the law of evidence, the POCSO Act, court directions and executive guidelines, and a victim has no single document stating what she may expect. Second, many protections are framed as obligations of the State rather than enforceable rights, and breach carries limited consequences. Section 166A of the Indian Penal Code, now re-enacted in the BNS, penalises public servants who fail to record information of specified offences,[29] but there is no equally specific accountability mechanism for degrading questioning, intrusive medical practice or delay. Third, judicial guidelines, though progressive, depend on the initiative of individual judges, and those in Sakshi were framed for child sexual abuse.
7. Findings
The research yields the following principal findings:
1. Secondary victimisation is a distinct and avoidable harm caused by institutional responses, and it accumulates across the police, medical, trial and post-trial stages.
2. Its principal causes are entrenched rape myths and gendered stereotypes, a procedural design that treats the victim as a source of evidence, inadequate training, and delay.
3. Indian law, including the BNSS, has progressively recognised victim dignity, and the Supreme Court has been a major source of safeguards; however, protections are fragmented and dependent on official discretion.
4. Victims rarely hold enforceable rights or remedies for violations, so protections remain aspirational where officials fail to comply.
5. Comparative models show that individual needs assessment, regulated cross-examination and statutory victims’ charters can coexist with fair trial rights.
6. Limited empirical data on victims’ experience in India hinders evidence-based reform.
8. Suggestions and Recommendations
On the basis of the analysis, the following reforms are recommended:
1. Enact a statutory Victims’ Charter. A consolidated charter should codify rights to information, dignity, protection, support and participation, with an accessible complaint mechanism and a remedy for breach, along the lines of the European Union’s Directive.
2. Mandate trauma-informed training. Police, forensic doctors, prosecutors and judicial officers should receive periodic training on trauma, consent and rape myths through police and judicial academies and medical colleges, linked to performance evaluation.
3. Provide victim support persons. Building on Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum, trained support persons or advocates should accompany victims from the first report to the verdict.
4. Regulate cross-examination. In sexual-offence trials, defence questions should routinely be routed through the judge, who must disallow questions that are irrelevant, degrading or repetitive, and an unrepresented accused should be prohibited from cross-examining the victim directly, with court-appointed counsel instead. These steps regulate manner, not substance, and preserve the right to challenge the evidence.
5. Ensure time-bound trials and information. Specialised courts, firm scheduling to limit adjournments, and case-tracking systems would keep victims informed and reduce attrition.
6. Conduct individual needs assessments. Early assessment of vulnerability should trigger special measures such as screens, video-conferencing and in-camera proceedings.
7. Strengthen accountability and data. Violations of victims’ rights should attract disciplinary consequences, and State authorities should collect and publish victim-experience data to guide reform.
9. Conclusion
This paper set out to examine how criminal justice institutions can harm those they exist to protect. In answer to the first research question, secondary victimisation is the additional harm caused by the responses of institutions and professionals, as distinct from the offender’s act (primary victimisation) or a further offence (repeat victimisation). In answer to the second, it arises at every stage: in police stations through disbelief and refusal to register complaints, in medical examinations through invasive practices, at trial through degrading cross-examination and confrontation, and after trial through delay, publicity and inadequate compensation.
On the third question, India’s constitutional jurisprudence, the BNSS, the POCSO Act and the Supreme Court’s directions provide a substantial but fragmented framework that falls short of the enforceable rights found in the European Union model. On the fourth, the reforms proposed, namely a statutory charter, training, support persons, regulated cross-examination, time-bound trials and accountability, are consistent with the accused’s right to a fair trial because they regulate the manner of examination and not the substance of the defence.
The legitimacy of criminal justice depends not only on convicting the guilty but also on how it treats those who come to it for help. A system that listens, informs and protects makes justice more likely to be done; one that disbelieves and exhausts victims inflicts a second injury and risks losing the cooperation on which it depends.
10. Bibliography
Books and Book Chapters
Ashworth, Andrew. Victims’ Rights, Defendants’ Rights and Criminal Procedure, in Integrating a Victim Perspective Within Criminal Justice (Adam Crawford & Jo Goodey eds., 2000).
Baxi, Pratiksha. Public Secrets of Law: Rape Trials in India (2014).
Christie, Nils. The Ideal Victim, in From Crime Policy to Victim Policy 17 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1986).
Estrich, Susan. Real Rape (1987).
Herman, Judith Lewis. Trauma and Recovery (1992).
Konradi, Amanda. Taking the Stand: Rape Survivors and the Prosecution of Rapists (2007).
Satish, Mrinal. Discretion, Discrimination and the Rule of Law: Reforming Rape Sentencing in India (2016).
Shapland, Joanna, Jon Willmore & Peter Duff. Victims in the Criminal Justice System (1985).
Temkin, Jennifer & Barbara Krahé. Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (2008).
Tyler, Tom R. Why People Obey the Law (1990).
Walklate, Sandra. Imagining the Victim of Crime (2007).
Journal Articles
Burt, Martha R. Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 217 (1980).
Campbell, Rebecca & Sheela Raja. Secondary Victimization of Rape Victims: Insights from Mental Health Professionals Who Treat Survivors of Violence, 14 Violence & Victims 261 (1999).
Campbell, Rebecca et al. Preventing the “Second Rape”: Rape Survivors’ Experiences with Community Service Providers, 16 J. Interpersonal Violence 1239 (2001).
Herman, Judith Lewis. The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention, 16 J. Traumatic Stress 159 (2003).
Orth, Uli. Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings, 15 Soc. Just. Rsch. 313 (2002).
Symonds, Martin. The “Second Injury” to Victims, 2 Evaluation & Change 36 (1980) (special issue).
van Dijk, Jan. Free the Victim: A Critique of the Western Conception of Victimhood, 16 Int’l Rev. Victimology 1 (2009).
Cases (India)
Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 S.C.C. 217 (India).
Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 490 (India).
Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India, (1995) 1 S.C.C. 14 (India).
Lalita Kumari v. Gov’t of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 S.C.C. 1 (India).
Lillu v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 S.C.C. 643 (India).
Mahender Chawla v. Union of India, (2019) 14 S.C.C. 615 (India).
Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 S.C.C. 752 (India).
Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 S.C.C. 703 (India).
Prakash Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 S.C.C. 1 (India).
Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 S.C.C. 518 (India).
State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1044 (India).
State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, (1991) 1 S.C.C. 57 (India).
Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 2 S.C.C. 143 (India).
Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 S.C.C. 158 (India).
Constitution and Legislation
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, No. 46 of 2023 (India).
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, No. 45 of 2023 (India).
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, No. 47 of 2023 (India).
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, No. 2 of 1974 (India) (repealed).
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983, No. 43 of 1983 (India).
India Const. arts. 14, 21.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No. 1 of 1872 (India) (repealed).
Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45 of 1860 (India) (repealed).
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, No. 32 of 2012 (India).
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, c. 23 (UK).
Reports and Official Documents
Comm. on Reforms of Crim. Just. Sys., Ministry of Home Affs., Report (2003).
Justice J.S. Verma Comm., Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (Jan. 23, 2013).
Law Comm’n of India, Report No. 172, Review of Rape Laws (2000).
Ministry of Health & Fam. Welfare, Guidelines & Protocols: Medico-Legal Care for Survivors/Victims of Sexual Violence (2014).
Nat’l Crime Recs. Bureau, Ministry of Home Affs., Crime in India 2022 (2023).
International Instruments
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, G.A. Res. 40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985).
Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 Establishing Minimum Standards on the Rights, Support and Protection of Victims of Crime, 2012 O.J. (L 315) 57.
[1] Lalita Kumari v. Gov’t of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 S.C.C. 1 (India).
[2] BNSS § 173(1) proviso.
[3] Id. § 183(6)(a).
[4] Prakash Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 S.C.C. 1 (India).
[5] Lillu v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 S.C.C. 643 (India).
[6] State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1044 (India).
[7] Ministry of Health & Fam. Welfare, Guidelines & Protocols: Medico-Legal Care for Survivors/Victims of Sexual Violence (2014).
[8] BNSS §§ 184, 397.
[9] Amanda Konradi, Taking the Stand: Rape Survivors and the Prosecution of Rapists (2007).
[10] IEA §§ 53A, 146 proviso (now replaced by corresponding provisions of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023).
[11] BNSS § 366(2).
[12] BNS § 72.
[13] Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 S.C.C. 217 (India).
[14] State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, (1991) 1 S.C.C. 57 (India).
[15] Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 S.C.C. 518 (India).
[16] POCSO Act §§ 24, 33, 36.
[17] Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 S.C.C. 158 (India).
[18] Mahender Chawla v. Union of India, (2019) 14 S.C.C. 615 (India).
[19] BNSS § 398.
[20] G.A. Res. 40/34, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, princ. 6(e) (Nov. 29, 1985).
[21] Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 S.C.C. 752 (India).
[22] Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 S.C.C. 703 (India).
[23] BNSS § 396.
[24] Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 S.C.C. 490 (India).
[25] Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of India, (1995) 1 S.C.C. 14 (India).
[26] G.A. Res. 40/34, supra note 44, princs. 4–6.
[27] Directive 2012/29/EU, supra note 20, arts. 3, 4, 22, 23.
[28] Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, c. 23, §§ 19, 23–24, 34, 41 (UK).
[29] Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45 of 1860, § 166A (India) (repealed and re-enacted in the BNS).