Regulation of Civil Aviation in India: Challenges in the Post-Pandemic Era: AUTHOR: Sribalaji G
Although Indian aviation has recovered in terms of volume it has not gained stability. Passenger numbers are once again above those seen before 2020. Indian aviation still faces the same issue: there is a mismatch between rules and reality. The failure of Go in 2023 and the crisis involving flight cancellations at IndiGo in December 2025 both show that the system is attempting to rebuild its regulations while Indian aviation continues to grow under the existing ones. This article looks at that situation and considers whether Indian aviation can cope with the demands of the post-pandemic market.
ARTICLE
INTRODUCTION
Although Indian aviation has recovered in terms of volume it has not gained stability. Passenger numbers are once again above those seen before 2020. Indian aviation still faces the same issue: there is a mismatch between rules and reality. The failure of Go in 2023 and the crisis involving flight cancellations at IndiGo in December 2025 both show that the system is attempting to rebuild its regulations while Indian aviation continues to grow under the existing ones. This article looks at that situation and considers whether Indian aviation can cope with the demands of the post-pandemic market.
THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE
For ninety years the Indian civil aviation sector was regulated by the Aircraft Act of 1934, a law from the colonial period which had been amended twenty-one times. Parliament has now replaced it with the Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024, which comes into force on 1 January 2025. The new Act has retained most of the previous structure but has given statutory status to three regulatory bodies: the DGCA with regard to safety, the BCAS concerning security, and the AAIB for accident inquiries.
The Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act of 2008 is also in place, this one dealing with airport tariffs and the Civil Aviation Requirements issued by the DGCA, among them the passenger rights rules set out in CAR Section 3, Series M. India has yet to establish an independent regulator similar to those in the telecommunications or electricity sectors. Appeals concerning decisions made by either the DGCA or the BCAS are forwarded directly to the Central Government and no further appeal is possible. Since the government is responsible for setting the policy and also for hearing the appeals against the regulator it has set up, it both formulates the policy and considers the appeals.
THE GO FIRST COLLAPSE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Go First ceased flying in May 2023 and became insolvent, leaving both the lessors and passengers in the lurch. Since Indian insolvency law regarded the aircraft on lease as part of the airline's assets, they could not be repossessed for several months, which was at variance with the Cape Town Convention's intention to enable lessors to reclaim their aircraft swiftly. In response, Parliament passed the Protection of Interests in Aircraft Objects Act, 2025, so that the rights under the Cape Town Convention take precedence over ordinary insolvency laws. Although this remedy was necessary it was also a reaction to the situation and it makes no provision for compensating passengers who had tickets that had been cancelled while the outcome of the airline's insolvency proceedings was being determined in court.
THE 2025 INDIGO CRISIS: RULE-MAKING UNDER PRESSURE
The most clear-cut example was in December 2025. After the court had directed that measures be taken regarding pilot fatigue, the DGCA amended the Flight Duty Time Limitations in two stages, on 1 July and 1 November 2025, reducing the number of permitted night landings for a crew from six to two per week. Since IndiGo carries over sixty per cent of all domestic passengers, it had not prepared sufficient spare crew capacity to accommodate the change. The number of cancelled flights reached between 170 and 200 each day, and by 12 December the airline had cancelled about 4,500 flights, impacting more than ten lakh passengers.
The DGCA's response combined enforcement with a degree of flexibility. It served a show-cause notice, put a cap on fares for the routes in question, arranged for refunds that were pending, and subsequently fined IndiGo ₹22.2 crore after an inquiry committee identified faults in crew planning, software support and management oversight. The regulator also granted IndiGo a temporary exemption from the rules which had caused the disruption until 10 February 2026 and sent its own inspectors to the airline's control centre. Although it took a firm line following the crisis, the airline had been aware of the rule since January 2024 and was not caught out until it had left three lakh passengers stranded over three days.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL BACKDROP
Aviation regulation is also part and parcel of the Supreme Court's general jurisprudence on safety. In Federation of Indian Airlines v Union of India, (2014) 4 SCC 337, the Court approved pilot rest-hour norms and mandated that passenger safety could not be left to the total discretion of airlines. This reasoning goes to the root of the IndiGo dispute, because fatigue management finds itself in the same Article 21 right-to-life framework as safety in other areas. The regulator is not merely balancing commercial interests but is fulfilling a constitutional mandate.
THE LEGAL GAP
None of this is to say that India does not have its own aviation laws. It has a consolidating statute, a lessor-protection law, a tariff regulator, and detailed passenger-rights CARs. The problem is one of timing and coordination. India's safety rules, while correctly framed, are rolled out without any assessment of the ability of the dominant carrier to absorb them. Its compensation rules, while in existence, are enforced only after the fact rather than requiring advance approval of readiness. And without an independent aviation authority, the same ministry that promulgates its rules also hears appeals against them by the regulator it has just created.
THE WAY FORWARD
First, before any significant safety rule with significant scheduling implications takes effect, the DGCA should mandate pre-certification of readiness by airlines in terms of both crews and systems. Second, an independent appellate tribunal for aviation would help de-link policymaking from adjudication. Third, compensation due to a systemic disruption should come automatically and speedily, not as an order month in arrears. Fourth, lessor and passenger protection should be read together since Go First has shown vulnerabilities in both. Finally, the regulator’s inspection capacity needs to scale up as rapidly as the fleets under its jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The pandemic did not cause India's aviation problems; it revealed that there was little room for error. Since then, Parliament has replaced a ninety-year-old statute, courts have reinforced safety as a constitutional value, and the DGCA has shown that it would fine even the country's largest airline. However, Go First's collapse and IndiGo's 2025 breakdown indicate that the same pattern persists: sound rules are enforced only after passengers have been stranded. The task at hand is not to write more law. It is to make the law act before the next crisis, not after it.
REFERENCES:
1. The Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024, Government of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation.
2. The Aircraft Act, 1934, Government of India, Ministry of Civil Aviation.
3. Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR), Particularly CAR Section3 – Air Transport, Series M – Air Transport.
4. Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008, Government of India.
5. Federation of Indian Airlines v. Union of India, (2014) 4 SCC 337.