THE LAWGICAL SOCIETY

CYBERSTALKING AND ONLINE HARASSMENT OF WOMEN: EMERGING CHALLENGES UNDER INDIAN CYBER LAW : Author: Aanya Agarwal

Social media, messaging applications and other digital platforms have changed how people communicate, and they have handed harassers new tools. Cyberstalking, impersonation, persistent unwanted contact, the non-consensual circulation of intimate images, threats, doxxing and fake online identities can damage a person's privacy, reputation and sense of safety without the offender and the victim ever meeting.

ARTICLE

Aanya Agarwal

9/24/202619 min read

Abstract

India has no single statute devoted to cyberstalking. The law is spread across the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), the intermediary rules made under that Act, and procedural and evidentiary legislation. Section 78 of the BNS is the central provision, since it treats monitoring a woman's use of the internet, email or other electronic communication as stalking.[1] This article explains how these laws fit together; the constitutional principles that shape them, drawing on Puttaswamy, Shreya Singhal and Anuradha Bhasin; the obligations placed on platforms after the February 2026 amendments to the IT Rules; and the practical obstacles victims meet, including anonymity, fragile evidence, harassment that moves between platforms, cross-border elements and under-reporting. It argues that criminalisation alone will not protect women online. Prompt investigation, careful evidence preservation, accessible complaint channels and responsive platforms matter just as much.

Keywords: cyberstalking, online harassment, women and cybercrime, Indian cyber law, digital privacy, Information Technology Act

Introduction

Much of daily life now happens online. People work, study, shop, campaign and argue on the same handful of platforms, and the features that make those platforms convenient are the ones that let harassment follow a person everywhere. A harasser does not need to wait outside anyone's house. From a phone in another city, a harasser can send a hundred messages before breakfast, watch what a woman posts and whom she talks to, set up an account in her name, or forward a private photograph to her colleagues.

For women, the abuse often takes a gendered form: sexualised messages, persistent advances after a clear refusal, threats, impersonation, and intimate images circulated without consent. The damage does not stay on the screen. It reaches reputations, studies, jobs and relationships, and it can make a woman think twice before going online at all. Blocking an account rarely solves anything, because another one appears. A single episode can also involve several kinds of wrongdoing at once, which complicates the legal response.

Indian law has responded in stages. The Information Technology Act, 2000 created the first cyber offences, and its 2008 amendments added provisions on identity theft, personation, privacy violations and sexually explicit material. Stalking became a distinct criminal offence in 2013, when the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act inserted section 354D into the Indian Penal Code (IPC), including the monitoring of a woman's electronic communication. The BNS has since replaced the IPC and carries that offence forward as section 78. Alongside the statutes sit the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, which govern what platforms must do when they host harmful content, and which were amended again in February 2026.

The question today is less whether online harassment can be punished (much of it can) than whether the system can respond quickly, consistently and fairly without sweeping in legitimate expression. This article walks through the constitutional background, the criminal provisions most often used, the duties of platforms, and the practical problems that decide whether a legal remedy is real for the woman who needs it.

1. What counts as cyberstalking and online harassment

Cyberstalking has no statutory definition in India. As a working description, it means persistent, unwanted conduct aimed at one person through digital channels. In practice that can include a stream of messages after the recipient has said no, tracking someone's posts, location or contacts, creating fake accounts, impersonating her, publishing her personal details, sending threats, and circulating private or morphed images.

Online harassment is the wider category. It covers repeated behaviour, but a single act can also be serious enough to attract criminal liability, such as a credible threat or the posting of an intimate image without consent.

Both are descriptive labels, not offences. A police officer or prosecutor still has to find a specific provision whose ingredients the facts satisfy, and not every rude, offensive or unpleasant exchange online clears that bar. The gap between what feels like harassment and what the law can charge is a theme that returns throughout this article.

2. The constitutional backdrop

Privacy, dignity and equality

The Constitution has no right titled "online safety", but several rights bear directly on the problem. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v Union of India ((2017) 10 SCC 1), a nine-judge Bench held that privacy is a fundamental right, tied to liberty, dignity and autonomy under Article 21. That matters in two directions. It describes what a stalker or a leaker of intimate images violates: control over personal information, private communications and one's own image. It also constrains the State. Puttaswamy requires that any intrusion on privacy rest on law, serve a legitimate aim and be proportionate, so the investigative powers used against harassers must respect the same principles.

Dignity and equality belong in the same conversation. Sexualised abuse, impersonation and the circulation of intimate images can push women out of public digital life, which harms equal participation as well as individual reputation. Treating such conduct as a minor nuisance because it happens "only online" misses this.

Freedom of speech

The other side of the ledger is Article 19(1)(a). In Shreya Singhal v Union of India ((2015) 5 SCC 1), the Supreme Court struck down section 66A of the IT Act [2]because terms such as "grossly offensive", "menacing" and "annoyance" gave no workable standard of what was criminal and chilled speech as a result. The same judgment read down section 79 and the related intermediary rules, holding that a platform's obligation to remove content arises only on actual knowledge, meaning a court order or a government notification. Later, in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India ((2020) 3 SCC 637),[3] a case about internet shutdowns in Jammu and Kashmir, the Court confirmed that restrictions affecting online expression must be proportionate and open to review.

Neither case protects harassment. Stalking, threats and invasions of privacy are not speech that Article 19 shelters, and Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on grounds that include decency, morality and incitement to an offence. Their lesson is about drafting and enforcement: laws aimed at online harm need clear ingredients, and the remedies they create need to be proportionate. That lesson is worth remembering when platforms are given very short takedown deadlines, as discussed in section 6.

3. Stalking under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

Section 78 applies to a man who[4] (i) follows a woman and contacts, or tries to contact, her to foster personal interaction, repeatedly and despite a clear indication of disinterest; or (ii) monitors her use of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication. The punishment is imprisonment of up to three years and a fine on a first conviction, and up to five years and a fine on a second or later conviction. The offence is cognizable, and the first offence is bailable. Four features of the section deserve attention.

Continuity. It is sometimes said that the BNS introduced the recognition of electronic monitoring as stalking. It did not. The monitoring limb has been part of Indian law since section 354D of the IPC was inserted in 2013, and section 78 carries[5] it over in substantially the same words. What changed was the statute book, not the substance.

The two limbs work differently. The first limb requires repeated contact and a clear signal of disinterest. The monitoring limb contains neither requirement; on its wording, monitoring is enough. The first limb also uses the word "follows", which was drafted with physical pursuit in mind, and how far it stretches to online conduct is not settled. Online cases may therefore turn on the monitoring limb, or on other provisions, rather than the first limb. Courts also read the section strictly. In an anticipatory bail order in Krishan Kumar Kasana v State of Himachal Pradesh ([2025:HHC:26503]), the Himachal Pradesh High Court held that an allegation of merely photographing a woman did not, on its face, amount to stalking, since there was no following and contacting to foster personal interaction. The case was not about online conduct, but it shows that the ingredients will be examined closely.

The offender must be a man and the victim a woman. Section 78 is gender-specific at both ends. A male victim, a victim who is not a woman, or a woman targeted by another woman cannot invoke it, and must rely on other provisions such as criminal intimidation, defamation or the IT Act offences discussed below. Whether that limit is justified is a fair question for reform. A law built to address male harassment of women has an obvious rationale, but it leaves gaps that harassers can occupy.

The proviso puts a burden on the accused. Conduct does not amount to stalking if the man proves that he was preventing or detecting crime as a person entrusted with that duty by the State, that he acted under a legal requirement, or that the conduct was "reasonable and justified" in the circumstances. The third exception is open-ended. It is likely to be tested where the accused claims a protective motive, such as a relative who says he was only checking on a woman's safety, and courts will have to decide how far that plea can go against a woman's autonomy.

Stalking is rarely the only offence in play. Section 75 [6](sexual harassment) covers a man who demands sexual favours, shows pornography to a woman against her will, or makes sexually coloured remarks; the first two attract up to three years' imprisonment and the remarks up to one year. Unsolicited explicit images sent to a woman fit most naturally within the second of these. Section 77[7] (voyeurism) punishes watching or capturing an image of a woman in a private act, and separately punishes sharing such an image without her consent even where she agreed to its capture; it carries one to three years on a first conviction and three to seven on a later one. Section 79[8] punishes words, sounds, gestures or objects intended to insult a woman's modesty, and also intrusion upon her privacy, with up to three years' simple imprisonment and a fine. Unlike section 75, it can be committed by anyone, but intention to insult modesty is an ingredient, so an offensive message alone will not be enough.

Other general provisions may also apply. Threats can amount to criminal intimidation[9] (section 351). Demanding money or favours under threat of releasing images may be extortion[10] (section 308). A false profile used to damage someone's reputation may raise defamation (section 356), and where it is used to deceive, cheating by personation (section 319).

4. The Information Technology Act, 2000

The IT Act supplies offences tailored to technology. They are charged alongside the BNS, not instead of it.

Section 66C punishes the fraudulent or dishonest use of another person's electronic signature, password or other unique identification feature, with up to three years and a fine of up to ₹1 lakh. It fits account takeovers and the misuse of stolen credentials. Whether a fake profile built from a woman's name and photographs falls within "unique identification feature" is more debatable, although prosecutors do add the section in such cases.

Section 66D punishes cheating by personation using a computer resource, again with up to three years and a fine of up to ₹1 lakh. The operative word is cheating. A fake profile is not an offence under this section merely because it exists; there must be personation and the deception that cheating requires, such as persuading someone to hand over money or do something they would not otherwise have done on the strength of the false identity.

Section 66E punishes intentionally or knowingly capturing, publishing or transmitting an image of a person's private area without consent, in circumstances violating privacy. The penalty is imprisonment of up to three years, a fine of up to ₹2 lakh, or both. It is gender-neutral and central to intimate-image abuse.

Sections 67 and 67A deal with publishing or transmitting obscene material and sexually explicit material in electronic form. Section 67 carries up to three years and a fine of up to ₹5 lakh on a first conviction, and up to five years and ₹10 lakh on a later one. Section 67A carries up to five years and ₹10 lakh on a first conviction, and up to seven years and ₹10 lakh on a later one. Where the victim is a child, section 67B and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 come into play and the analysis changes considerably.

Section 66A is no longer law. Shreya Singhal struck it down in 2015, and it should not appear in any complaint or FIR, whatever the facts.

Synthetic images raise a further question. Section 66E speaks of capturing, publishing or transmitting an image of a person's private area,[11] and it is arguable whether a fabricated image qualifies. Sections 67 and 67A, section 79 of the BNS and defamation may be the more comfortable fits, alongside the platform-side rules discussed in section 6.

The table below shows how common forms of conduct map onto these provisions. It is a starting point for analysis, not a substitute for it, because the ingredients of each provision must be made out on the facts.

CONDUCT

Provisions worth examining

Persistent contact after a clear refusal

BNS s 78(1)(i); s 75 (sexually coloured remarks or showing pornography against her will); s 79 if the intent is to insult her modesty

Monitoring a woman's internet use, email or messages

BNS s 78(1)(ii)

Threats of harm, or of releasing images

BNS s 351 (criminal intimidation); s 308 (extortion) if money or favours are demanded

Taking over or misusing her accounts or passwords

IT Act s 66C; ss 43 and 66 (computer-related offences)

A fake profile used to deceive others

IT Act s 66D; BNS s 319 (cheating by personation); s 356 (defamation) if her reputation is harmed

Private images captured or shared without consent

BNS s 77 (voyeurism); IT Act s 66E; ss 67 and 67A

Obscene or sexually explicit material circulated

IT Act ss 67 and 67A; BNS s 75(1)(iii) if it is shown to her against her will

5. What courts have done with these provisions

State of Tamil Nadu v Suhas Katti (Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, 5 November 2004) is widely reported as the first conviction in India for posting obscene material online under section 67 of the IT Act. The accused, whose marriage proposal the complainant had refused, posted obscene and defamatory messages about her in a Yahoo group and opened a fake email account in her name; she began receiving calls from strangers who believed she was soliciting. He was convicted under sections 469 and 509 of the IPC and section 67 of the IT Act, and sentenced to concurrent terms, the longest being two years' rigorous imprisonment. The case moved fast, with conviction reported within about seven months of the FIR, and the prosecution relied on evidence that linked the messages to the accused through an IP address and a cyber café owner.

Kalandi Charan Lenka v State of Odisha (Orissa High Court, 16 January 2017) involved a college student who received obscene messages on her own phone and her father's, then anonymous letters, and later discovered a fake Facebook profile in her name carrying morphed nude images. The accused was charged under IPC provisions on sexual harassment, stalking, insulting modesty, forgery to harm reputation and defamation, and under sections 66C and 67 of the IT Act. The High Court refused bail, stressing the seriousness of the harm to the victim's dignity.

Two things stand out. The same conduct drew charges under several statutes at once, which is typical of these cases. And in both, the accused was identified and prosecuted. The more difficult cases are those where the person behind the account is never found.

6. The role of platforms

Most online harassment happens on someone else's infrastructure, so a victim's first need is often to get content or an account taken down, not to see anyone prosecuted. Platforms' duties come from section 79 of the IT Act, which gives intermediaries "safe harbour" from liability for user content if they observe due diligence, and from the 2021 Rules, which spell that diligence out. An intermediary that fails to observe the Rules loses that protection (Rule 7). The Rules were amended in 2022, 2023, October 2025 and, most significantly for this subject, in February 2026 (notified on 10 February, in force from 20 February).

Three routes matter. First, where a court order or a reasoned written intimation from a specially authorised senior government officer gives a platform actual knowledge of unlawful content, Rule 3(1)(d) now requires removal within three hours, down from thirty-six. Second, a user can complain to the platform's grievance officer, who must acknowledge the complaint within twenty-four hours and resolve it within seven days (previously fifteen). Complaints seeking removal of content in the categories listed in Rule 3(1)(b), which include obscene material, material invasive of privacy, material insulting or harassing on the basis of gender, and impersonation, must be resolved within thirty-six hours. Third, Rule 3(2)(b) lets an individual, or someone acting on her behalf, complain about content that exposes her private area, shows her in full or partial nudity or in a sexual act, or impersonates her, including through artificially morphed images. The 2026 amendment shortened the platform's deadline for acting on such complaints from twenty-four hours to two. A user unhappy with a grievance officer's decision, or with delay, can appeal within thirty days to a Grievance Appellate Committee (Rule 3A), which is to try to decide the appeal within thirty days.

The 2026 amendment also brings "synthetically generated information" into the Rules, meaning deepfakes and other realistic AI-generated audio-visual content. Intermediaries that offer generation tools must deploy reasonable technical measures to prevent the creation of non-consensual intimate imagery, and lawful synthetic content must be labelled and carry provenance metadata. Where a user contravenes these rules, the platform may also have to identify the user and, in accordance with applicable law, disclose the user's identity to a victim who complains. For women targeted with fabricated intimate images, this is a significant development on paper. Civil-society groups such as the Internet Freedom Foundation have warned that deadlines this short leave little room for human review and may push platforms to over-remove, a concern that echoes Shreya Singhal. How the regime works in practice remains to be seen.

It is worth keeping the two tracks apart. Getting content removed does not decide anyone's criminal liability, and a criminal complaint does not automatically get content removed from every platform. A victim who pursues only one may find the other is still needed. Because the Rules have been amended repeatedly, readers should check the current consolidated text on the website of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) before relying on a particular deadline.

7. Evidence, investigation and reporting

Cyberstalking cases usually stand or fall on electronic evidence, and electronic evidence is fragile. Messages are deleted, accounts vanish, and content is edited or copied within minutes. Victims are therefore often advised to preserve the record before doing anything else, including blocking or reporting an account. Useful material includes:

screenshots showing the sender, date, time and, where visible, the URL;
profile links, usernames, account IDs, email addresses and phone numbers used by the harasser;
original emails and chats, exported where the application allows, rather than screenshots alone;
call logs, and any payment or delivery records connected to the harassment;
reports made to the platform, and its replies; and
the phone or computer on which the material was received, kept unaltered where possible.

Screenshots help investigators, but courts want more. Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which replaced section 65B of the Evidence Act from 1 July 2024, makes an electronic record admissible without producing the original device if the statutory conditions are met and a certificate in the prescribed form accompanies it. The certificate has two parts: Part A, completed by the person producing the record, which includes the record's hash value (a digital fingerprint showing the file has not been altered), and Part B, completed by an expert. The Supreme Court upheld this requirement against a constitutional challenge in Pune Bar Association v Union of India (order of 22 May 2026), and clarified that the "expert" is not confined to examiners notified under section 79A of the IT Act. The practical lesson is to keep the original files and devices and to involve a qualified examiner early, not after the messages have been deleted.

Platforms hold evidence too. Under Rule 3(1)(g), an intermediary that removes or disables content following a court order, a grievance or its own action must preserve that content and associated records for 180 days for investigation purposes, or longer if a court or authorised agency requires. Requests to platforms should therefore not wait.

On procedure, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) allows information about a cognizable offence to be given electronically (section 173), although the informant must sign it within three days for it to be taken on record as an FIR. A "zero FIR" can be registered at any police station regardless of where the offence occurred. If the police refuse to register a complaint, the informant can send it in writing to the Superintendent of Police (section 173(4)) and, failing that, apply to the Magistrate (section 175(3)). For IT Act offences, investigation is carried out by an officer not below the rank of inspector (section 78 of that Act).

Complaints can be filed through the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (cybercrime.gov.in), which has a dedicated route for crimes against women and children and lets complainants track progress. The portal's anonymous option has been described by the government as covering child sexual abuse material and rape or gang-rape content, so a stalking complaint will usually need to go through the "report and track" route so that police can contact the complainant. The national cybercrime helpline is 1930, and 112 is the emergency number. Where there is any immediate threat to physical safety, the emergency number comes first.

8. Practical difficulties

Anonymity. Harassers use fake profiles, temporary accounts, borrowed credentials and VPNs. That makes identification harder, but anonymity is not invisibility. In Suhas Katti, an IP address and a cyber café owner's testimony led to the accused. Registration data, IP logs and device identifiers can lead investigators to a person, provided they can be obtained, preserved and connected. Under Rule 3(1)(j), an intermediary must give information or assistance to a lawfully authorised government agency within seventy-two hours of a written order, but platforms based abroad may insist on formal channels, and responses can still take longer in practice.

Moving between platforms. A harasser who is blocked on one service can reappear on another, or on email. Each incident is then reported separately, and the pattern that makes the conduct stalking can disappear from view. A complaint that presents a dated timeline across platforms is far easier to act on than a series of isolated screenshots.

Cross-border elements. The offender, the victim, the platform and the data may all sit in different countries. Section 75 of the IT Act extends the Act to offences committed outside India where the conduct involves a computer, computer system or network located in India, but jurisdiction on paper is not the same as obtaining evidence from a foreign company or a foreign police force. Mutual legal assistance is slow, and harassment does not wait.

Under-reporting. A legal remedy that is not used protects no one. Women may hold back because of stigma, fear of retaliation, worry about their families' reaction, uncertainty about whether the conduct is "serious enough", or doubts about how the complaint will be received. Sensitive handling at station and clear public information about reporting routes address some of these barriers, though not all.

9. Newer problems

Manipulated content. Realistic fake images, video and audio can now be produced cheaply. The 2026 Rules address the platform side, but the criminal law was drafted with the capture and publication of real images in mind, and its fit with fabricated material is still being worked out.

Doxxing. Publishing a woman's address, phone number or workplace to invite harassment has no dedicated offence in India. Depending on the facts it may fall under stalking, criminal intimidation or section 79 of the BNS. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 regulates how organisations handle personal data, but section 3(c)(i) excludes personal data processed by an individual for personal or domestic purposes, so it may well leave an individual harasser outside its reach.

Speed and disappearance. Once harmful material is posted, copies spread to other accounts before the original is removed, so a takedown on one platform may not end the problem. Disappearing messages create the opposite difficulty, since the evidence may vanish before it is saved. And automated tools let a harasser generate accounts and messages at a volume no individual victim can keep up with.

10. Strengthening the response

More offences are not the main need. The existing provisions cover a great deal of conduct, and the harder task is making them work in time. Complaints about continuing harassment need prompt attention, including early preservation requests to platforms, because delay costs evidence. District-level police need forensic training and tools to handle devices, platform records and electronic-evidence certificates without sending every case to a distant laboratory. Police guidance on which sections to invoke, and on avoiding provisions like the defunct section 66A, would reduce both under-charging and over-charging.

Platforms, for their part, need to meet the new two-hour and three-hour windows with real human review for borderline cases, and to publish enough data for the public to judge whether they do. Victims need to know where to go and what to keep. And lawmakers should consider the gaps identified above, including protection for victims who are not women, a clear answer on doxxing and clarity on fabricated intimate imagery, while keeping every new power within the proportionality standard that Puttaswamy and Anuradha Bhasin require.

Conclusion

Technology has changed not only the form of harassment but its speed, reach and persistence. India's response is a set of overlapping laws. Section 78 of the BNS, continuing the 2013 IPC offence, treats monitoring a woman's electronic communication as stalking. The BNS also offers sections 75, 77 and 79 and the general provisions on intimidation, extortion and defamation. The IT Act[12] adds offences on identity theft, personation, privacy violations and obscene or sexually explicit material. The 2021 Rules, as amended in February 2026, put faster, more specific duties on platforms.

Yet the existence of a provision does not deliver protection. Anonymous accounts, harassment that hops between platforms, fragile evidence, cross-border data and social barriers to reporting all stand between a woman and a remedy. At the same time, Shreya Singhal is a standing reminder that laws against harmful speech must be precise enough to distinguish harassment from criticism and dissent.

Protecting women online will therefore depend as much on investigation, forensic capacity, accessible complaint channels and responsible platform action as on the criminal code. The aim is a system that responds to technological change while holding to the values the Constitution puts at its centre: privacy, dignity, equality, liberty and freedom of expression.

This article states the law as at 24 September 2026 and is intended for academic discussion. It is not legal advice.

REFERENCES/CITATIONS:

Constitution and statutes

Constitution of India, arts 14, 19(1)(a), 19(2) and 21.
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Act 45 of 2023), ss 75, 77, 78, 79, 308, 319, 351 and 356.
Indian Penal Code, 1860, s 354D (inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013; repealed and replaced by the BNS).
Information Technology Act, 2000, ss 43, 66, 66A (struck down), 66C, 66D, 66E, 67, 67A, 67B, 75, 78 and 79.
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, ss 173 and 175.
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s 63 and the Schedule.
Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, s 3.

Rules

Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, as amended, including G.S.R. 794(E) (28 October 2022), G.S.R. 275(E) (6 April 2023), G.S.R. 775(E) (22 October 2025) and the Amendment Rules, 2026, G.S.R. 120(E) (10 February 2026, in force 20 February 2026).

Cases

Shreya Singhal v Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1.
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.
Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India (2020) 3 SCC 637.
Pune Bar Association v Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 599 of 2026 (Supreme Court, order of 22 May 2026).
State of Tamil Nadu v Suhas Katti, C.C. No. 4680 of 2004 (Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, 5 November 2004).
Kalandi Charan Lenka v State of Odisha, BLAPL No. 7596 of 2016, 2017 SCC OnLine Ori 52 (Orissa High Court, 16 January 2017).
Krishan Kumar Kasana v State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr [2025:HHC:26503] (Himachal Pradesh High Court).

Official and other sources

India Code, Government of India: the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Information Technology Act, 2000.
Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India: Intermediary Rules (updated as on 10.02.2026) and FAQs on the 2026 Amendment Rules.
Government of India, National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal, cybercrime.gov.in.

Internet Freedom Foundation, "IT Intermediary Amendment Rules, 2026 contradict their purpose

[1] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Act No. 45 of 2023, § 78.

[2] Shreya Singhal v Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1

[3] Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637.

[4] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 78.

[5] Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013; Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 354D; Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 78.

[6] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, § 75.

[7] Ibid., § 77.

[8] Ibid., § 79.

[9] Ibid., § 351.

[10] Ibid., § 308.

[11] Information Technology Act, 2000, § 66E.

[12] Information Technology Act, 2000, §§ 66C–66E, 67 and 67A.