ARTICLE: Trying Children as Adults: Regulating Discretion Under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 in Light of the Roper v Simmons, AUTHOR: Arya Chandran
Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 allows a Juvenile Justice Board to determine on case by case basis whether an accused child aged sixteen to eighteen should be treated as an adult in case of committing a heinous crime. This article examines the Supreme Court's rulings on this issue from Shilpa Mittal to X v. State of Bihar (2026) and compares it with the absolute age limit of eighteen for capital punishment in Roper v. Simmons. It contends that while the principle of case-by-case assessment is accepted, in practice it is hardly functional without statutory guides, and provides proposed safeguards: set criteria, qualified experts, a presumption and burden, and reasoned, reviewable orders.
ARTICLE


Abstract
Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 allows a Juvenile Justice Board to determine on case by case basis whether an accused child aged sixteen to eighteen should be treated as an adult in case of committing a heinous crime. This article examines the Supreme Court's rulings on this issue from Shilpa Mittal to X v. State of Bihar (2026) and compares it with the absolute age limit of eighteen for capital punishment in Roper v. Simmons. It contends that while the principle of case-by-case assessment is accepted, in practice it is hardly functional without statutory guides, and provides proposed safeguards: set criteria, qualified experts, a presumption and burden, and reasoned, reviewable orders.
Keywords
Juvenile Justice Act 2015; Section 15; Preliminary Assessment; Heinous Offence; Bright-Line Rule; Roper v. Simmons
1. Introduction
Under Indian juvenile justice legislation, individuals below the age of 18 are presumed to be less blameworthy. Section 15 of the JJ Act provides for an exception to this rule.[1] Children aged 16 and above who have committed heinous crimes will be subject to an individualised consideration by a Juvenile Justice Board to determine whether they should be tried as adults. Since its introduction in response to the 2012 Delhi gang rape, there has been consistent litigation in the Supreme Court regarding Section 15.[2]
Currently, in X v. State of Bihar (2026), murder was found to be a heinous crime, and detailed guidance was provided for Boards to apply in considering individualised consideration.[3] However, this guidance is judicial. In Section 15, there is little definition given about what factors must be considered, how these can be applied, and what expert input should be sought. By contrast, in Roper v. Simmons, an absolute rule was imposed. No individuals under 18 can be sentenced to death.[4]
To conclude, although individualised consideration in Section 15 is reasonable, it is precarious. As science is unreliable in determining whether marginal cases fall into one category or another, statutory safeguards should be implemented by Parliament.
2. Legal Framework - How Section 15 Operates
Under the JJ Act, crimes can be classified as petty (under 3 years), serious (3-7 years) or heinous (minimum 7 years or more).[5] Therefore, only heinous crimes will trigger consideration under Section 15, for children aged 16 and above.
Within initial consideration, there are four factors to be considered; the child’s physical capacity to commit the crime, mental capacity to commit the crime, understanding of the implications, and circumstances of the crime.[6] Expert input may be taken from experienced psychologists, psycho-social workers or other experts. Initial consideration should not constitute a trial.
Following initial consideration, the case may be transferred to Children’s Court, which will make the final decision on whether to try the child as an adult. Orders are appealable to the Court of Session.[7] However, certain protections remain. Death and life sentences without parole are not permitted. The child will be placed in a place of safety, and at age 21, the matter will be reviewed in the Children’s Court.[8]
The scheme within this section aligns with constitutional and international principles. Article 14 and 21 ensure fair and non-arbitrary processes. Article 39(e)-(f) puts a duty on the state to support the healthy development of children.[9] In addition, as India has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, children should only be detained as a last resort.[10] Furthermore, the committee overseeing the convention has encouraged states to abolish exceptions to juvenile justice to prevent older children being tried as adults.[11]
3. The Gateway: Where the Bright Line Already Sits
In Shilpa Mittal, it was decided that as no minimum sentence was set for offences with a maximum sentence of more than 7 years, the offence falls under “serious”, not “heinous”. As a result, Section 15 does not apply.[12] This interpretation was formalised by Parliament in 2021.[13] However, in X v. State of Bihar, murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, (with a maximum sentence of death or life) was determined to be a heinous crime. As life imprisonment is the lowest possible sentence, and exceeds 7 years, it was decided that lack of mention of a minimum sentence does not make it a “serious” crime.[14]
Therefore, we can see that the application of Section 15 is already governed by an absolute rule. Only children 16+ and with an offence classified as heinous will be subject to individualised consideration. Therefore Section 15 is a semi-individualised consideration, and the fairness of it depends on the content of the consideration.
4. Inside the Assessment: Judicial Structuring from Barun Chandra Thakur to X
Prior to X, decisions such as Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu established that consideration of these factors must be made on their merits, rather than simply accepting expert opinion.[15] Within X, it was established that each of the 4 factors must be considered individually and collectively. The consideration must not be a determination of guilt, and so expert reports cannot be used as conclusive evidence.[16] Social Investigation Reports and Social Background Reports are relevant information that should be given proper weight.[17]
The court also referred to a list of factors from the Gujarat High Court. These included previous judgements, academic performance, history of mental illness and mental and emotional maturity.[18] This list bears similarities to that in Kent v. United States , in which it was required for a juvenile court to have a hearing and reasoning before waiving jurisdiction.[19] However, the list in this case provides structure, although it is judicially created. The factors within it are not weighted and so, although similar factors must be considered by each board, each board will determine how significant each factor may be.
5. Roper’s Categorical Rule and What It Reveals About Section 15
Roper v. Simmons held that it is unconstitutional to impose death sentences on offenders under 18 under the 8th Amendment.[20] The court identified 3 key differences between juveniles and adults. Firstly, juveniles lacked maturity and responsible judgement. Secondly, juveniles were more susceptible to external influences. Thirdly, juveniles had not developed a complete character.[21]
As this determination was unreliable, an absolute rule was applied. Even using expert opinion, it was uncertain whether an offence committed by a juvenile could be attributed to temporary immaturity or, in rare cases, complete corruption. Although imperfect, the decision to impose an absolute rule at age 18 was accepted, as this is recognised by society as the boundary between childhood and adulthood.[22]
However, this raises questions about the fairness of Section 15. Individualised consideration is being made to determine capacity and understanding of implications. However, the characteristics indicated by Roper (impulsiveness, susceptibility to peer pressure, and malleable character) are very different to the understanding of implications which can be tested by this statutory criterion. However, within India, Section 21 means that no child, including those being tried as adults, can receive a death sentence or life sentence without parole.[23] Therefore, although the absolute rule regarding age is similar to Roper within sentencing, discretion is applied regarding transferring the case. Thus, it is this process which poses greatest risk.
6. Why Judicial Guidelines Alone Cannot Secure Reliable Assessments
Factors in consideration lack clarity. The fourth factor, circumstances of the offence, allows boards to infer maturity based on seriousness of the crime. Although X indicates that this consideration should not be a determination of guilt,[24] there is nothing to stop boards from concluding that, if a child has committed a harsh crime, they must have capacity to do so.
Quality of consideration lacks reliability. The board consists of a magistrate and 2 members. Experts may be used, but they are not required. In cases where they are used, they must be experienced.[25] This guidance assumes that there will be competent and independent reports from experts in every district.
Standard of proof and relationship between stages of consideration are unclear. The board must make a decision within 3 months. The Children’s Court and Sessions Court may take a different view, using different experts.[26] Without a presumption that the child should be treated as a child, with the same facts, different decisions can be reached. For example, in X, a board decided that a child did not have capacity. However, this finding was overturned in appeal.[27]
7. Statutory Safeguards Parliament Should Supply
The content of consideration should be clarified. The four factors should be specified, and it should be made clear that seriousness of the crime cannot be evidence of capacity. There should be a presumption that children will be treated as children, but if the prosecution can prove otherwise, children may be tried as adults.
Procedural guidance should be provided. The panel should have specific qualifications in child psychology and psychiatry. Each factor should be given reasoned consideration, and results should be disclosed to the child and legal representatives. A right to be heard and to obtain an independent assessment should be given. On appeal, a single level of review should be applied. Annual data from each state on cases should also be published. This will allow Parliament to determine whether this provision is working effectively.
8. Counterarguments and Limitations
Comparison to Roper has limitations. First, Roper concerned death sentences, whereas this case concerns the court which a child is to be tried in. In America, it is common for individuals to be transferred to adult court following individualised consideration similar to that in Kent.[28] In later decisions, individualised consideration has been required at sentencing for youth.[29] Roper is therefore only a reference as to the scientific considerations behind juvenile justice, and is not something which has been poorly followed in India.
Those supporting Section 15 may object. Firstly, if an absolute rule applied at 18, it would not take account of victims, or public safety. Secondly, following the 2012 incident, Parliament specifically chose to apply individualised consideration. The Supreme Court has supported Parliament’s decision to decide what qualifies as juvenile, and the Verma Committee did not recommend lowering this threshold.[30] Finally, individualised consideration is preferable to automatically transferring people depending on the category of their crime, as some legislation has done. However, although there are reasons to retain Section 15, it should not be poorly regulated.
There are also limitations to this article. As the research was drawn from published cases/ reports, there is no empirical evidence as to how decisions have been made in Boards. It is therefore unclear if implementing these safeguards would mean fewer children would be transferred, or just formalise the process.
9. Conclusion
Section 15 is not purely individualised or absolute. Absolute rules apply to determine eligibility for consideration and sentencing. However, individualised consideration is applied in between, meaning that this stage poses the greatest risk of making incorrect decisions. The warning of Roper that individualised consideration of adolescents is unreliable is very relevant here. Although improved guidance has been given in X v. State of Bihar, reliance on expert opinion, quality of resources and consistency in applying guidance cannot be ensured through judicial guidance alone. To support this provision, Parliament should specify the factors to consider; presuming children will be treated as children; imposing qualifications on experts and procedures to follow; and requiring data collection. If this is done, Section 15 can be justified as a small, well-reasoned exception. If not, fairness in this provision will vary from district to district.
References
Cases - India
Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu, (2022) 9 SCC 331 (India).
Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat, MANU/GJ/1115/2023 (Guj. 2023).
Salil Bali v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705 (India).
Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787 (India).
X v. State of Bihar, Criminal Appeal No. 3299 of 2026, 2026 INSC 728 (India July 21, 2026).
Cases - United States
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Constitution, Statutes and Rules — India
INDIA CONST. arts. 14, 21, 39.
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, No. 45 of 2023 (India).
Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860 (India).
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, No. 2 of 2016 (India).
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Act, No. 23 of 2021 (India).
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 (India).
International Materials and Reports
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
Justice J.S. Verma, Justice Leila Seth & Gopal Subramanium, Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (Jan. 23, 2013).
U.N. Comm. On the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 24 (2019) on Children’s Rights in the Child Justice System, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/24 (Sept. 18, 2019).
Author Note
Arya Chandran is a BA LL.B. student at Lord’s Universal College of Law, Mumbai. She is particularly interested in Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and the way the law responds to new technology. Alongside her studies, she enjoys Legal Research and Writing, and following current Legal Developments
[1] Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, No. 2 of 2016, § 15, India Code (2016) [hereinafter JJ Act].
[2] See Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787 (India) (discussing the Act’s legislative background).
[3] X v. State of Bihar, Crim. App. No. 3299 of 2026, 2026 INSC 728, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 702 (India July 21, 2026) [hereinafter X v. Bihar].
[4] Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
[5] JJ Act §§ 2(33), 2(45), 2(54).
[6] Id. § 15(1); Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016, r. 10 (India).
[7] JJ Act §§ 18(3), 19(1), 101(2).
[8] Id. §§ 19–21.
[9] India Const. arts. 14, 21, 39(e)–(f).
[10] Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 37(b), 40(1), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
[11] U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 24 (2019) on Children’s Rights in the Child Justice System, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/24 (Sept. 18, 2019).
[12] Shilpa Mittal, (2020) 2 SCC 787.
[13] Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Amendment Act, 2021, No. 23 of 2021 (amending JJ Act § 2(54)).
[14] X v. Bihar, 2026 INSC 728 (applying JJ Act § 2(33) to Indian Penal Code, 1860, No. 45 of 1860, § 302, India Code); see also Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, No. 45 of 2023, § 103, India Code (2023) (successor provision).
[15] See Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu, (2022) 9 SCC 331 (India).
[16] X v. Bihar, 2026 INSC 728.
[17] Id.
[18] Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Gujarat, MANU/GJ/1115/2023 (Guj. 2023) (India) (quoted in X v. Bihar, 2026 INSC 728).
[19] Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 565–68 (1966) (policy memorandum appended to opinion).
[20] Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79.
[21] Id. at 569–70.
[22] Id. at 573–74.
[23] JJ Act § 21.
[24] See X v. Bihar, 2026 INSC 728.
[25] JJ Act §§ 4(2), 15(1).
[26] Id. §§ 14(3), 19(1), 101(2).
[27] See X v. Bihar, 2026 INSC 728.
[28] Kent, 383 U.S. at 557, 561.
[29] See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (barring life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offences).
[30] See Salil Bali v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 705 (India); Justice J.S. Verma et al., Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (Jan. 23, 2013).
