ARTICLE: Dignity in Default: Section 17(1)(f) of the DPDP Act 2023 and Borrower Protection in Digital Debt Recovery, AUTHOR: Himanshu Dhar
Section 17(1)(f) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 (DPDP Act) exempts processing undertaken to ascertain the finances of a borrower who has defaulted on a loan from a financial institution. This article asks whether, read with the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) recovery norms, the exemption leaves a defaulter any enforceable protection against intrusive recovery. It argues that the clause is narrower than it looks, as it shelters no contact with employers, relatives or referees, but weaker than it should be, as within its limits it removes every statutory data right. A narrow reading and six reforms can protect dignity without defeating asset discovery.
ARTICLE


Abstract
Section 17(1)(f) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 (DPDP Act) exempts processing undertaken to ascertain the finances of a borrower who has defaulted on a loan from a financial institution. This article asks whether, read with the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) recovery norms, the exemption leaves a defaulter any enforceable protection against intrusive recovery. It argues that the clause is narrower than it looks, as it shelters no contact with employers, relatives or referees, but weaker than it should be, as within its limits it removes every statutory data right. A narrow reading and six reforms can protect dignity without defeating asset discovery.
Keywords: data protection; debt recovery; section 17(1)(f); proportionality; borrower dignity
1. Introduction
Recovery is where a lender’s informational advantage is widest and the borrower’s capacity to resist narrowest. After the surge in instant-loan apps, borrowers complained that agents messaged phone contacts and circulated shaming messages; the RBI’s Working Group on Digital Lending reported on such apps in 2021,[1] and the RBI reissued its recovery-agent instructions in 2022.[2]
Section 17(1)(f) of the DPDP Act exempts processing to ascertain the financial information, assets and liabilities of a person who has defaulted on a loan from a financial institution. It disapplies most of Chapter II, all of Chapter III (the data principal’s rights) and section 16, leaving only sections 8(1) and 8(5).[3] The principal obligations commence on 13 May 2027,[4] so the analysis is prospective.
The gap between paper and practice is familiar: Kavana M finds in anti-corruption law that the difficulty lies less in missing provisions than in enforcement,[5] and Abarna Tiwari concludes that India has a takedown system but not yet a redress system.[6] Debt recovery shows the same pattern.
2. The Rules Today
The Act. The Act rests on notice and consent (sections 5 and 6). Section 7’s ‘legitimate uses’ include no limb for contractual performance or debt recovery, unlike article 6(1)(b) and (f) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).[7]
The RBI. The Digital Lending Directions 2025 make regulated entities answerable for borrower data held by service providers and require disclosure of recovery agents’ identity.[8] Amendment directions of 6 August 2026, effective 1 January 2027, confine discussion of the debt to the borrower or guarantor, deem harassment of relatives, referees, friends or co-workers ‘harsh’ and require calls to be recorded and kept for six months.[9]
Remedies. A borrower may complain to the lender and then to the RBI Ombudsman, who can award up to ₹3 lakh for harassment and ₹30 lakh for consequential loss.[10] The Supreme Court’s disapproval of coercive recovery in ICICI Bank v Prakash Kaur,[11] and the general criminal and civil law add little. Each remedy is reactive; none lets a borrower learn what is held, correct it or see who received it.
3. Reading the Exemption
What survives. Section 8(1) keeps the lender responsible for its agents, and section 8(5) keeps the security duty. Gone are notice, consent, accuracy (section 8(3)), breach intimation (section 8(6)), erasure (section 8(7)) and the rights in sections 11 to 14. A lender whose defaulter data leaks stays liable for poor security but need not tell the borrower.
Who can claim it. The clause borrows ‘financial institution’ and ‘default’ from the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC).[12] Scheduled banks and non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) qualify; lending apps, recovery agencies, non-lender fintechs and unregulated lenders do not. An agent processing for a lender shelters derivatively, but one pursuing its own purposes, such as selling collection leads, cannot.
When it switches on. Default means non-payment of any part of a debt that has fallen due, with no materiality threshold. The exemption therefore operates from the first missed instalment and is self-certifying: the lender’s ledger decides, and the borrower has lost the access and correction rights needed to test it.
Three limits. First, the clause covers the defaulter’s own data only, so employers, relatives, referees and phone contacts keep every statutory right. Second, it covers only ‘ascertaining’, a verb of inquiry. Disclosing a default to others, calling repeatedly and publishing details are pressure, not ascertainment. A lender will say ascertainment may involve speaking to others, but that proves too much: it would absorb the very tactics the RBI prohibits, and genuine third-party discovery remains possible by consent or court order. Nor can section 17(1)(a), which requires processing ‘necessary for enforcing any legal right or claim’, rescue pressure tactics; otherwise clause (f) would be superfluous.
4. Testing the Exemption Against Practice
Third parties. Third parties’ numbers and employer details are their personal data. Clause (f) does not exempt them and section 7 supplies no ground for using them, so consent is required once Chapter II commences. That gives the borrower no right, however. If a disclosure is ascertainment, the exemption applies and no remedy exists; if pressure, the whole Act applies. Characterisation decides everything, guided by one verb. Practitioner commentary on recovery proceeds as if borrowers held full data-principal rights and does not mention section 17(1)(f).[13]
Two illustrations (constructed by the author). The neutral message: an agent asks an employer’s HR desk to have the borrower call back urgently. Nothing about assets is ascertained, so clause (f) does not apply. The stale record: a borrower settles a debt, calls continue for weeks and the agency’s defaulter list later leaks. Clause (f) displaces sections 8(3) and 8(6): no correction, no notice of exposure.
The inversion. A bank or NBFC may claim the exemption but sits under the RBI code and the Ombudsman. An unregulated app lender cannot claim it, so its borrower holds full data rights, yet that lender sits outside both.
Is the RBI code enough? It is not. It regulates conduct, not information, so it gives no right to know, correct or delete. It works through supervision and lender policy, and an intimidated borrower is least able to press a complaint through the lender’s own process. Conduct codes and enforceable information rights are complements, not substitutes. Those who run recovery desks know the practical question is rarely what the statute allows but what was said on the call and whether anyone can prove it.
5. Proportionality
In Puttaswamy I, nine judges held that privacy, including informational privacy and dignity, is protected by article 21 and that interferences must satisfy legality, legitimate aim and proportionality.[14] The Aadhaar judgment applied a four-part test: legitimate goal, rational connection, necessity and balancing.[15] Section 17(1)(f) is Parliament’s choice and so State action, and manifest arbitrariness can invalidate legislation under article 14.[16]
Legality, legitimate aim (asset discovery) and rational connection are met; necessity is the weak point. Ascertaining assets does not require removing the duties of accuracy, erasure and breach intimation. The State’s best argument is that notice and access could tip off a dishonest borrower. That has force for those two but none for the rest, which tip nobody off and protect honest borrowers against error. The clause has no purpose limitation, audit or independent review. A court is likelier to save it by narrow construction than strike it down, which supports Part 3’s reading.
6. What Other Systems Do
In the European Union a lender may process a defaulter’s data on legitimate-interest grounds, but the data subject keeps rights of access, rectification, erasure and objection, and restrictions must be necessary and proportionate.[17] India removes the rights and omits the balancing. Under the United States Fair Debt Collection Practices Act a collector may contact third parties only for location information, must not reveal the debt and generally may call once; consumers can sue.[18] The United Kingdom’s Consumer Credit sourcebook requires forbearance and reasonable steps to stop third parties learning of the debt.[19] The lessons: data rights and conduct rules coexist, third-party contact is confined to location, and remedies are enforceable.
7. Closing the Gap: Six Proposals
First, limit clause (f) to processing necessary for ascertainment, using the IBC’s closed meaning of ‘financial information’. Second, leave a residual core: a short notice that can accompany the default notice, accuracy, erasure once ascertainment ends, breach intimation, and a right to know the categories of data used and recipients, deferrable briefly where live tracing would be prejudiced. Third, confine contact about the debt to the borrower, a joint obligor, a guarantor or an authorised representative; others may be contacted only once, for location, without disclosing the debt, or with consent.
Fourth, require an access log of who used which borrower’s data and why, and extend call-recording retention beyond six months to the period in which complaint routes remain open; the DPDP Rules already require one-year log retention for the surviving security duty.[20] Fifth, create one complaint route through a referral protocol between the Board and the Ombudsman and a data-specific head of compensation in each recovery policy. Sixth, extend the exemption to agents only as processors under a written contract incorporating these limits.
The RBI can implement the third to fifth proposals; Parliament is needed chiefly for the first two. The cost is modest: every fiduciary will carry these duties for other customers anyway, while a misattributed default costs a borrower dearly.
8. Conclusion
Section 17(1)(f) is narrower than it appears. It covers only processing to ascertain a defaulter’s own finances and shelters no contact with employers, relatives, referees or guarantors, nor the use of phone data to pressure repayment. Within those bounds, however, the borrower has no statutory data right and no duty of notice, accuracy, erasure or breach intimation. Practical protection comes from the RBI’s code, which from 1 January 2027 is detailed but remains a regulatory duty enforced through supervision and capped awards. The clause is weakest on necessity, though a narrow construction can preserve it. The reforms above would let lenders keep asset discovery while giving borrowers a protection they can enforce. With obligations commencing on 13 May 2027, there is still time to choose deliberately.
[1]Reserve Bank of India (RBI), ‘Report of the Working Group on Digital Lending including Lending through Online Platforms and Mobile Apps’ (November 2021).
[2]RBI, ‘Outsourcing of Financial Services: Responsibilities of Regulated Entities Employing Recovery Agents’ (RBI/2022-23/108, 12 August 2022).
[3]Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 (DPDP Act) ss 17(1), 17(1)(f).
[4]MeitY, G.S.R. 843(E); Digital Personal Data Protection Rules 2025 (DPDP Rules), G.S.R. 846(E) (13 November 2025).
[5]Kavana M, ‘Criminal Accountability for Political Corruption in India: Assessing the Adequacy of the Existing Legal Framework and the Need for Reform’ (The Lawgical Society, 27 October 2026) <https://thelawgicalsociety.com/research-paper-criminal-accountability-for-political-corruption-in-india-assessing-the-adequacy-of-the-existing-legal-framework-and-the-need-for-ref>.
[6]Abarna Tiwari, ‘Takedown to Redress: Legal Remedies for Non-Consensual Intimate Images and Sexual Deepfakes in India’ (The Lawgical Society, 26 October 2026) <https://thelawgicalsociety.com/research-paper-takedown-to-redress-legal-remedies-for-non-consensual-intimate-images-and-sexual-deepfakes-in-india-author-abarna-tiwari>.
[7]DPDP Act s 7; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) art 6(1)(b), (f).
[8]RBI (Digital Lending) Directions 2025 (RBI/2025-26/36, 8 May 2025).
[9]RBI (Commercial Banks – Responsible Business Conduct) Fourth Amendment Directions 2026 (RBI/2026-27/223, 6 August 2026) paras 454P, 454Y(1), 454Z; NBFC equivalent: RBI/2026-27/230.
[10]Reserve Bank – Integrated Ombudsman Scheme 2026 (in force 1 July 2026).
[11]ICICI Bank Ltd v Prakash Kaur (2007) 2 SCC 711.
[12]Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 ss 3(12), 3(14); RBI Act 1934 s 45-I.
[13]Smita Paliwal, ‘Privacy Meets Recovery: Rethinking Debt and Invoice Collection under India’s DPDP Act’ (King Stubb & Kasiva, 12 January 2026).
[14]Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.
[15]Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1 (Sikri J).
[16]Shayara Bano v Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1.
[17]GDPR arts 6(1)(f), 15–17, 21, 23.
[18]15 USC §§ 1692b, 1692c(b), 1692k; Regulation F, 12 CFR pt 1006.
[19]Financial Conduct Authority, Consumer Credit sourcebook (CONC), ch 7.
[20]DPDP Rules r 6.
