ARTICLE: Beyond Criminalisation: Reimagining the State's Positive Constitutional Duty to Ensure Women's Safety in Public Spaces, AUTHOR: ABARNA TIWARI
In India, violence against women in public tends to follow a familiar script: an atrocity, public outrage, and then a new or harsher law. This article argues that the script overlooks the real constitutional question. Women’s safety in public is about more than punishing offenders once the harm has been done. Under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, the State owes women a duty to build the physical, institutional and social conditions in which they can move about freely. Drawing on Indian case law and international due-diligence standards, the article sets out a framework that measures the State by the conditions it creates rather than the convictions it secures
ARTICLE


Abstract
In India, violence against women in public tends to follow a familiar script: an atrocity, public outrage, and then a new or harsher law. This article argues that the script overlooks the real constitutional question. Women’s safety in public is about more than punishing offenders once the harm has been done. Under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21, the State owes women a duty to build the physical, institutional and social conditions in which they can move about freely. Drawing on Indian case law and international due-diligence standards, the article sets out a framework that measures the State by the conditions it creates rather than the convictions it secures.
Keywords
positive obligations; Article 21; due diligence; public spaces; gender justice; substantive equality
I. Introduction
The 2012 Delhi gang rape brought us the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, the Nirbhaya Fund and a wave of reform.[1] Then in 2024 a trainee doctor was raped and murdered inside a Kolkata hospital, and what followed felt painfully familiar: protests, the Supreme Court taking the matter up on its own motion, and fresh calls for tougher punishment.[2] Meanwhile the criminal law has kept growing. It now sits within the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which retains and widens offences such as rape, gang rape, voyeurism and stalking.[3] Yet official data still record hundreds of thousands of crimes against women every year.
Something deeper is going on here. Criminal law steps in only once someone has been hurt, so it can’t tell us why a woman is unable to wait safely at a bus stop at night, use a public toilet or walk down a dark stretch of road. The constitutional question, then, is not only what the State may punish but what it must provide. This article argues that the Constitution imposes an enforceable duty on the State to protect women’s safety in public spaces, and that honouring that duty requires thinking in a different way from criminal law.
II. Where the Punishment-First Approach Falls Short
Three limits stand out.
First, deterrence comes from the likelihood of being caught and convicted, not from the severity of the sentence. The Justice Verma Committee, set up after 2012, found that the real failure lay in how the law was implemented and governed rather than in any shortage of law, and it pointed instead to police accountability and institutional reform.[4] Tougher punishments, including the death penalty for some offences, haven’t altered that conclusion.[5]
Second, this approach leaves the burden of staying safe with the woman herself. Advice about clothing, curfews and “safe” hours, whether it comes from families, institutions or officials, pushes the cost of the State’s inaction onto women’s freedom. The Supreme Court has already rejected this thinking where judicial stereotyping is concerned, directing that courts must not impose bail conditions that reinforce patriarchal assumptions.[6] The same logic carries over to public policy. A city that is safe only for those who stay at home isn’t a safe city.
Third, punishment mostly ignores the physical and social conditions that make harassment possible. Research on how women use urban space finds that fear and exclusion grow out of poor lighting, weak public transport, inadequate sanitation, and the lack of any accepted reason to simply linger. The right to “loiter” is, at bottom, a claim to full citizenship.[7] Criminal law, by its nature, can’t fix any of this.
III. The Constitutional Basis for a Positive Duty
A. Article 21: Life, Dignity and Movement
The Supreme Court has long read Article 21 as doing more than keeping the State from interfering with our rights. It also obliges the State to act: to protect life and to remove the barriers that threaten it.[8] In Vishaka, there was no legislation on the point, so the Court built enforceable guidelines against sexual harassment at work. It drew on Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21, read with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).[9] That reasoning later became statute in the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, which requires employers to prevent harassment and not merely punish it.[10]
Vishaka matters because it treats safety as a basic condition of taking part in public life as an equal. If safety at work belongs to the right to earn a living with dignity, then safety on the street, in transport and in the public facilities that make work, study and civic life possible deserves the same protection. Dignity under Article 21 can’t end at the office door, or at the front door either.[11]
B. Articles 14 and 15: Real, Not Just Formal, Equality
Article 15(1) bars discrimination on grounds of sex, while Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women. The Court has embraced substantive equality in cases such as Joseph Shine and Navtej Singh Johar. Read this way, these provisions ask the State to look at how its choices actually affect women, and not simply whether the rules look neutral on paper.[12] Public infrastructure that is open to everyone in theory but practically unusable for half the population after dark fails that test. Article 51A(e), which asks citizens to renounce practices that demean women, and the directive principles in Articles 38 and 39 support this reading. They are aids to interpretation, though, and not freestanding rights that can be enforced on their own.[13]
C. How Far Do Positive Obligations Reach?
A recent Constitution Bench decision confirms that fundamental rights, Article 21 above all, can require the State to protect people from harm inflicted by private individuals.[14] That point is central here. Most violence against women in public is committed by private individuals, so the constitutional wrong lies in the State’s failure to take reasonable steps to prevent it. The framework therefore doesn’t need to blame the State for the assault itself. It rests on the State’s failure to do what it was duty-bound to do.
IV. Lessons from Abroad: The Due Diligence Standard
International and comparative law supply a standard we can actually work with. Under CEDAW, as the Committee explains in General Recommendations 19 and 35, States must act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, prosecute and remedy gender-based violence, including violence by private actors.[15] In the Cotton Field case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held Mexico responsible for failing to prevent a pattern of disappearances and murders of women even though the risk was plain, and it linked that failure to discrimination[16]. The same reasoning appears in Opuz v Turkey, where the European Court of Human Rights found that the State’s failure to act on a known risk breached the Convention and, in that context, amounted to sex discrimination.[17]
These cases share a pattern: (i) a foreseeable, recognisable risk; (ii) a reasonable step the State could have taken; and (iii) a failure to take it. Applied in India, that pattern turns vague aspiration into questions a court can actually decide. Sustainable Development Goal 11.7, which commits States to universal access to safe and inclusive public spaces, especially for women and children, gives Indian courts a further yardstick when they interpret Article 21.[18]
V. India’s Record: Plenty of Schemes, Little Accountability
India isn’t short of schemes. The Nirbhaya Fund, the Safe City projects, the Emergency Response Support System (112) and assorted transport safety directives all exist on paper, issued by the Ministry of Women and Child Development and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The trouble is that these are executive programmes with no matching legal duty behind them. When money goes unspent, work is delayed or the design is poor, a woman who is harmed or shut out has nothing she can enforce. Policing and public order sit in the State List, while urban infrastructure is divided among municipal bodies, transport authorities and state departments, so responsibility ends up scattered.[19] The Supreme Court’s directions on police reform, meant to strengthen policing and insulate it from interference, are still applied unevenly, which shows how wide the gap can be between what courts order and what institutions actually do.[20]
The Court has shown it will step in where such gaps exist. In Laxmi, it issued binding directions on regulating acid sales and on compensation, treating prevention as part of the State’s responsibility.[21] More recently, after the Kolkata incident, it set up a National Task Force to recommend safety protocols for medical professionals, accepting that safety has to be designed into systems and can’t rest on prosecution alone.[22] These steps are encouraging, but they are one-off responses, and they don’t rest on any clear doctrine of duty that litigants can rely on.
VI. A Proposed Framework for the Duty
A positive-duty framework for women’s safety in public spaces could be built on four elements.
1. A duty to assess risk. The State and local bodies should carry out and publish regular safety audits of public transport, streets, markets and sanitation facilities. The findings should be broken down by gender, and the women who use these spaces should be part of the process. Failing to audit areas of known risk would itself be a breach.
2. A duty to take reasonable preventive steps. Where an audit or crime data points to a risk, the State must respond in proportion. That might mean better lighting, last-mile transport, staffed public toilets or trained responders. The test would be reasonableness and available resources rather than guaranteed results, which respects the separation of powers while still letting courts review clear and obvious inaction.
3. A duty to respond in an accessible and sensitive way. Safety also depends on whether women trust the reporting system. Police and emergency services must be trained, and monitored for how quickly and how well they respond. Complaints about harassment in public must not be brushed aside or turned into advice about how women should behave.[23]
4. A duty to be open and offer redress. Budgets, the use of dedicated funds and audit results should be reported publicly. When the State fails in its duty, there should be a remedy, whether through a writ, compensation or continuing mandamus.
Any such framework also has to be weighed against privacy and liberty. Heavy surveillance, including widespread CCTV and facial recognition, must satisfy the tests of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality laid down in Puttaswamy. Otherwise safety could become an excuse for monitoring women themselves.[24] The goal is to widen women’s freedom, not to watch over it.
VII. Responding to Likely Objections
Two objections deserve an answer. The first is that courts can’t decide budgets and infrastructure. Yet the Supreme Court has repeatedly issued continuing directions where government inaction defeats fundamental rights, and a standard of reasonable measures keeps courts in a supervisory role. The second is limited resources. Limited resources may justify rolling things out in phases, but they can’t justify having no plan at all. A duty of progressive realisation, together with open and clear prioritisation, accommodates budget limits without letting them become a complete excuse.
Nor does this article argue that criminal law should be dropped. Penal provisions are still needed to express society’s condemnation and to stop offenders from causing further harm. The point is about order and emphasis: criminal law should be the State’s last line of response, not its first.
VIII. Conclusion
A constitutional order that values dignity and real equality can’t treat women’s safety as something to deal with only after women have been harmed. The text and spirit of Articles 14, 15 and 21, read alongside India’s international commitments, support a duty on the State to create safe public spaces. Accepting that duty changes the question we ask after every tragedy. It stops being only whether the offender was punished and becomes whether the State did what it should have done to prevent the crime in the first place. If courts recognise the duty, legislators write due-diligence standards into law, and municipal bodies are held to account, India can move past criminalisation towards a jurisprudence of conditions. In that world, a woman’s presence in public is not a risk to be managed but a right to be secured.
[1] Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013; Mukesh v State (NCT of Delhi) (2017) 6 SCC 1.
[2] Re: Alleged Rape and Murder Incident of a Trainee Doctor in R.G. Kar Medical College and Hospital, Kolkata and Related Issues, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl) No 2 of 2024 (SC).
[3] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, ss 63-64 (rape), s 70 (gang rape), s 77 (voyeurism), s 78 (stalking).
[4] Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law (Justice J S Verma Committee) (January 2013).
[5] On the deterrence debate, see Law Commission of India, Report No 262: The Death Penalty (2015).
[6] Aparna Bhat v State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 230.
[7] Shilpa Phadke, Sameera Khan and Shilpa Ranade, Why Loiter? Women and Risk on Mumbai Streets (Penguin 2011).
[8] Pt Parmanand Katara v Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 286.
[9] Vishaka v State of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241.
[10] Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013
[11] Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v Union of India (1995) 1 SCC 14; Justice K S Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.
[12] Joseph Shine v Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39; Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1.
[13] Constitution of India, arts 15(1), 15(3), 38, 39, 51A(e).
[14] Kaushal Kishor v State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 4 SCC 1.
[15] CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19 (1992) and General Recommendation No 35 (2017).
[16] González et al ('Cotton Field') v Mexico, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No 205 (2009).
[17] Opuz v Turkey App no 33401/02 (ECtHR, 9 June 2009).
[18] United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals, Target 11.7 and Target 5.2.
[19] Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List II, entries 1 and 2.
[20] Prakash Singh v Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 1.
[21] Laxmi v Union of India (2014) 4 SCC 427.
[22] Re: Alleged Rape and Murder Incident of a Trainee Doctor in R.G. Kar Medical College and Hospital, Kolkata and Related Issues, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl) No 2 of 2024 (SC).
[23] Aparna Bhat v State of Madhya Pradesh 2021 SCC OnLine SC 230.
[24] Justice K S Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.
